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I. Introduction
The successful accession to membership in the European Union (EU) by the current transition-economy applicants, the Czech Republic, Hungary, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia
Poland and the Baltic republics, will depend to a large extent on their ability to align themselves with the institutions and the macroeconomic policies of the EU. Although structural change and institutional adaptation to EU norms will also be important in this process, in this paper we focus on the convergence of monetary policy between the candidate countries and the EU. The convergence of monetary policy between the EU and the candidate countries will be a necessary, though by no means sufficient, condition for establishing exchange rate stability between the Euro zone and the newly joining countries. We examine the prospects for such a convergence of monetary policies by investigating the extent to which the candidate countries have been able to achieve some measure of convergence between the evolution of their money stock with that of Germany, which we use as a historical proxy for the future monetary policy stance of the European Central Bank (ECB). We also compare the convergence achieved by the five most advanced transition-economy candidate countries to that achieved by countries that have recently become members of the EU, by several non-transition candidate countries and by some transition economies whose candidacy for EU membership has been deferred because they are making slower progress toward stabilizing their economies and introducing market mechanisms and institutions.
In the next section of the paper we motivate the inquiry and describe the exchange rate regime that is likely to govern the relations between the new members of the EU and the current members. We expect this exchange rate regime to display a tighter relationship between the 4 national currencies of the new members and the Euro than is allowed under the conditions of ERM II. Based on this characterization, we argue that, if the candidate countries were successful in having Germany "dominate" their monetary policy in recent years in the way that Germany was alleged to dominate the policies of other EU countries under the EMS, then the transition economies should have the potential to conform to the monetary policies of the ECB. The statistical tests of this domination of candidate-country monetary policy by Germany are developed and presented in Section 3 and the implications of these findings and the inter-country comparisons drawn from them are set out in Section 4.
EU Membership and Monetary Convergence
Much as the Maastricht criteria played a key role in the creation of a common currency among some of the EU member countries, macroeconomic performance will play a key role in determining which of the transition economies will join the EU and when. Indeed, the introduction of the Euro among a core subset of EU countries makes macroeconomic convergence a more pressing issue than it was for earlier entrants into the EU. As McKinnon (1999, p. 132) points out, the gains to the transition-economy candidates from joining the EU will only be realized if "trade takes place over an exchange-rate regime that is mutually acceptable between East and West". McKinnon argues that a regime of fixed exchange rates between the candidate countries and the Euro is the regime most likely to inspire such mutual confidence and to realize the full benefits of integration. In part this is so because fixed exchange rates between the currencies of these new member countries and the Euro will facilitate the rapid growth of the new members' exports to the rest of the EU without raising fears of "beggar-thy-5 neighbor devaluations or unfair trading practices". 1 Moreover, a credible adherence to a Euro peg will serve as an important spur to the structural and institutional changes required of the transition economies, thus guaranteeing to the EU that its new members will not backslide in their efforts at structural and institutional reform. As for the non-transition candidates for EU membership, although they do not face as great a task in creating economic and social institutions consistent with EU membership as do the transition-economy candidates, they, too, face the need to align their exchange rate closely to the Euro to realize the benefits of membership. indicators such as the inflation rate, the current account, macroeconomic policy, interest rates, productivity and employment, and indebtedness.
However much observers can agree on the formal markers of stability and macroeconomic convergence, the process of transition itself renders highly problematic any quantitative judgment regarding the values that these markers should take in order to make a currency peg credible. Consider for example the inflation rate. The transition economies are undergoing considerable restructuring, and this restructuring will generate large and persistent Balassa-Samuelson effects (Kopits, 1999) . In addition, a large gap exists between the price level of the transition economies and those of the EU member countries (Jana ková, 2000; Richards and Tersman, 1996) . Large Balassa-Samuelson effects mean that there is scope for a corresponding real appreciation of the equilibrium exchange rate that would come about through rates of inflation that exceeded those in the EU. Because the ex ante measurement of the BalassaSamuelson effect is fraught with considerable difficulty, a policy of targeting inflation to a level equal to the sum of the EU 's rate of inflation plus the Samuelson -Balassa effect is impractical at best and quite dangerous to the long-term viability of a peg to the Euro at worst. Price equalization in the presence of a peg also requires that the transition economy maintain a rate of inflation that exceeds that of the EU, but, as with the Balassa-Samuelson effect, with a differential that cannot be accurately predicted. 3 The transition economies will also continue to experience greater relative price changes that those occurring in the EU, and this factor, too, will contribute to higher rates of inflation in the transition countries (Coorey et al., 1998) . In addition, inflation rates in transition economies may not properly reflect actions of central banks because of the periodic liberalization of administered prices and because of the introduction of, or 7 increases in the rates of, VAT and fuel taxes, which serve as random inflationary impulses. In sum, inflation in the transition economies at rates higher than the EU average should be expected after accession, but there is no effective way of gauging ex ante whether the resulting real appreciation is so large as to undermine the credibility of that peg, and, thus, even medium-term convergence of inflation rates is not a good indicator of the credibility of a transition economy's peg to the Euro.
Similar reservations can be raised about the use of other traditional markers of macroeconomic performance. For example, interest rates in these countries are unlikely to reflect EU levels or cyclical fluctuations, even if the transition economies were to follow closely the monetary policies of the ECB. In part this is due to the large differences in risk faced by depositors in the transition economies and in the EU. In the transition economies there remain banks whose loan portfolios are troubled by non-performing loans and problems of moral hazard as firms struggle to survive by accumulating debts that may never be repaid, and, as a result, risks in transition economies are much higher than they are in the EU. On the other hand, the return to capital may also be higher than it is in the EU due to the opportunities offered by the restructuring of economic activity. Finally, government policy has acted to preserve a high spread between lending and deposit rates as a way of helping the banking system deal with losses from problem loans. Likewise, given the great changes in resource allocation in the transition economies and the problems of establishing a proper social safety net and socially acceptable means of bargaining over wages, the evolution of the natural rate of unemployment in transition economies will also be hard to define (Cross, 2000) .
This leaves the money stock as the best measure of convergence between the transition economy candidates for EU membership and the Euro-zone countries. If the candidate countries 8 are able to follow the policies of the ECB in terms of a monetary aggregate target, then, as their financial systems mature and as the transitory effects of transition on inflation and interest rates recede, they will be able to achieve the same outcomes in terms of inflation and interest rates as are achieved by the ECB. In the meantime, so long as they can mimic ECB policies regarding the growth of the money base, then any inflation differential between themselves and the EU can be seen as reflecting Balassa-Samuelson effects and the process of price convergence. Hence, such a "revealed" measure of these two effects should not undermine the credibility of these counties' peg to the Euro. Following the ECB's policies on money supply growth will thus be the best guarantee that the transition-economy members of the EU will achieve a measure of policy convergence that will allow them, first, to maintain a credible peg against the Euro and, eventually, to consider adopting the Euro as their currency as well.
In the empirical work reported in this paper, we focus on base money, the narrowest monetary aggregate available. We choose this monetary aggregate over broader measures of money supply for two reasons. The first is that we are concerned with policy convergence or the domination of transition-economy monetary policy by the Bundesbank and, ultimately, by the ECB. Consequently, we focus on that measure of money that best reflects the policy stance of the monetary authorities, and base money serves this purpose better than do broader monetary aggregates because it better captures central bank policy and is less diluted by the intervention of other agents in the financial system. Moreover, broader measures of money are likely to experience growth or contraction over time as the result of innovations in, or reforms of, the financial system, and we expect that such shocks will continue to be quite important in transition economies. Thus, to maintain focus on central bank policies rather than on their outcomes, we use base money as our monetary aggregate.
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The ability of these countries to follow the policy leadership of the ECB cannot be determined directly, principally because the ECB has not been in existence long enough to develop a sufficient track record of policy setting. However, it is commonly accepted that the ECB hopes to follow rather conservative policies, reflecting in large part the approach of the Bundesbank. At the same time, many of the transition economies did, at various times in the 1990s, maintain a peg or a crawling peg vis a vis the German mark. Consequently, if it can be demonstrated that these economies were able to follow the leadership of the Bundesbank in setting the growth of the base money stock, then we can have a high degree of confidence in the ability of these countries to follow the leadership of the ECB in setting the same aggregate.
As McKinnon (1999) If the central banks of the new members were to accept this role, as seems likely, they would not only have to frame policies that were "dominated" by the goals of the ECB, but they would also have to adopt similar tactics for pursuing these goals. The stated goal of the ECB is to follow a policy of medium-term price stability, with the goal set out in quantitative terms (ECB, 1998) . To achieve its objectives, the ECB will focus on the growth of a reference monetary aggregate and guide itself by a broadly based assessment of price developments.
Conceptually, the notion that the ECB's policies will dominate those of the new EU members may have much in common with the alleged domination of other European countries by the Bundesbank in the EMS. This hypothesis of the German domination or leadership in the EMS meant that other members of the EMS closely aligned their monetary policies to those of Germany in order to benefit from the reputation of the Bundesbank and the credibility of its policies. 4 Although the literature on this hypothesis did not reach a definitive conclusion as to the existence of such leadership by the Bundesbank, it does raise the question of whether the new members can successfully be "dominated" by the ECB, that is, whether they can successfully mimic the ECB's policies and gradually achieve the convergence between their rates of inflation and those of Euro zone that will be necessary for their effective membership in the EU.
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There is a number of conditions that the transition economies must meet if they are to achieve such a convergence between themselves and the Euro zone. One is that they must have the political will to do so, and their central banks must have the freedom to pursue appropriate policies, and financial markets must be developed enough to provide for the effective transmission of central bank policies to the economy.
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Another is that they must choose the appropriate indicator to which they will seek to converge. The literature on German domination of the EMS considered a number of macroeconomic aggregates or indicators, including interest rates, the growth of the money stock, and exchange rates, as variables whose evolution could shed light on German leadership. In the foregoing discussion, we have already explained why , in the case of the transition economies, some of these variables would be inappropriate indicators of convergence. Consequently, we focus our inquiry on the stock of base money.
Tests of Bundesbank Domination of Candidate-Country Monetary Policy
Monthly data on base money in national currency units were obtained from line 14, "reserve money", of the IMF's IFS tape. Our sample of countries includes the leading Central
European transition-economy candidates for admission to the EU, two Baltic countries, Estonia and Latvia, who are also likely to be considered for admission soon, and two Balkan countries, Bulgaria and Romania, whose membership is some time off. We also included in our sample
Cyprus, Malta and Turkey, market economies that are also seeking to enter the EU as well as Austria, Finland and Sweden. The former group of market economies is included in our sample to enable us to determine whether market-economy candidates for EU membership are more responsive to German monetary policy than are transition-economy candidates. The latter group of market economies consists of the most recent members of the EU, and their inclusion will enable us to judge the degree to which these countries' policies were dominated by German monetary policy shortly before and then after their joining the EU. We excluded data from the pre-1993 period, both to avoid the early transition period and its financial chaos and to be able to include the Czech and Slovak Republics in the analysis, and, in some cases, data availability forced us to truncate the data set somewhat. The sample ends in 1998-2000 depending on data availability.
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The data are set out in 
A. The Long-Term Relationship between German and Transition-Economy Base Money
The first step in our analysis is to determine the time-series characteristics of the data.
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As the relevant procedures are well known from the literature on the German domination of the EMS cited above, we merely report that the series on base money, seasonally adjusted and in logs, for the countries examined in this paper are all I(1), meaning that they must be firstdifferenced to make them stationary. 7 These findings allow us to test whether each of the candidate country's base money data are cointegrated with those of Germany. If such cointegration exists, then there exists a long-term relationship between the two series, and the two series will move together over time (Engle and Granger, 1987) . Moreover, Engle and
Granger show that such cointegrated variables can be represented by an error-correction model and that there must exist Granger causality (Granger, 1969) in at least one direction, that is from one of the cointegrated variables to the other. Findings of cointegration mean that the candidate country's base money stock responds to changes in the base money stock of Germany, and that, thus, in the language of the literature, the base money stock of the candidate country is Granger caused or "dominated" by Germany.
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We employed the Phillips-Perron test for cointegration (Phillips and Perron, 1988 ). This test is based on a correction of the t-statistic for the test coefficient on the assumption that the series are characterized by higher-order serial correlation. This correction is nonparametric, and it is robust to autocorrelation of unknown form and as well as to heteroskedasticity. We also employed the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test (Dickey and Fuller, 1981) , but this test was less powerful in most cases than the PP test, and thus we do not report the ADF results.
Although Gonzalo (1994) suggests that the Johansen (1988) test may be more powerful than the two step method used here to identify cointegration, this applies only if there is a need to identify multiple cointegrating vectors. In our bivariate model there can be at most one cointegrating vector. Moreover, if the variables are cointegrated, then OLS estimates, as obtained in this paper, are "super-consistent" estimates of the cointegrating parameters. In addition, Stock (1987) demonstrates that that the OLS estimates of the cointegrating parameters generated by our approach converge more rapidly than do estimates in OLS models using stationary variables.
Nevertheless, because any errors in step one of our two-step procedure could be carried over to step two, we also used the Johnasen test, and the results of support the conclusions drawn from our two-step procedure. The results for the non-transition economies are less mixed. Of the three non-transition candidates for EU membership, two, Cyprus and Malta, and the three most recent EU members, Austria, Finland and Sweden, all exhibit cointegration between their base money stocks and that of Germany. Indeed, for Austria and Finland, the PP test statistic is quite high, and that of Sweden would doubtless also be higher were we to exclude the period of financial turmoil surrounding that country's devaluation. Only for Turkey in this group of countries can we reject the hypothesis of German domination, a result unsurprising from an examination of Figure 3 .
The domination by Germany of the monetary policy of the most recent members of the EU and of two of the non-market economy candidates for EU membership is strong evidence that participation in the EU, and eventually, in the Euro zone, will require the domination of the ECB over the monetary policies of new members. In this regard, the mixed results for the transition economies must be interpreted with some caution. If their failure to follow the policy making leadership of the Bundesbank is due to the desire of monetary authorities in these transition economies to achieve alternative economic goals, such as the stimulation of growth and economic restructuring at a rate that exceeds that of EU countries or the lowering of inflation at a pace that differs from that of Germany, then EU membership on the basis of a framework follow German policy is due to their central bank's inability or lack of freedom to implement the appropriate monetary policy or to control the stock of base money, then, for these countries, the results above serve as a strong warning sign on the road to EU membership.
B. The Short-Run Dynamics of the German-Transition Economy Base Money
Relationship
As mentioned above, if two series are cointegrated, then there exists an error-correction representation of the relationship between the first differences of the two series. The error correction term measures how rapidly the money base in the candidate country reacts to deviations from the long term relationship between the two money stocks. We therefore estimated the standard VAR specification augmented by an error correction term for each of the countries for which we accepted the cointegration hypothesis. by the long-run relationship between the logarithm of the country's stock of base money and that of Germany. In this specification, the evolution of the growth of the national stock of base money depends on the magnitude of the coefficient of the error correction term, , on the persistence of domestic monetary policy as given by i x , t-i, and on the responses of the country to short term fluctuations in German monetary policy as given by i x , t-i . We set t equal to 12, meaning that changes in national and German money stocks were lagged for 12 months, but, in several cases, a likelihood ratio test indicated that a lag of only 6 months yielded satisfactory results, and we thus opted for the more parsimonious specification. For several countries, a dummy variable was used to capture a structural break caused by turbulence, change in exchange rate regime, etc. These dummy variables and the time period they cover are also reported in Table 2 .
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The greater the value of , the more rapidly a country's monetary authorities react to any divergence in the long-term relationship between their base money stock and that of Germany.
An examination of Table 2 reveals significant differences between the three categories of countries as well as some differences within each category. Of the three EU member countries, Austria and Finland react the most rapidly to disturbances in the long-run relationship between their money base and that of Germany. The time needed to eliminate the gap ranges from slightly over one month for Austria to about 7 months for Sweden, with Finland adjusting in about 3 months. Malta and Cyprus, the market-economy candidates for EU membership, adjust in about 6 and 9 months, respectively, perhaps because, not being members yet, they do not perceive the 11 One dummy that we did not incorporate was a dummy for the formation of the Euro zone. A referee suggested that this change in regime should also be represented by a dummy. However, a Chow test showed no structural breaks in either German monetary policy or in that of the countries whose results would have been changed by the inclusion of this dummy. Moreover, including the dummies makes it more likely that the dominance hypothesis will be accepted. Indeed, by including the dummies, the results change to the extent that we accept cointegration between German and Hungarian money stock series.
need for as close a coordination with the Bundesbank's policies as is the case for the EU member countries in our sample. The somewhat larger sample of transition economies yields a range of estimates of adjustment time that ranges from 3 months for Slovakia to almost 10 months for Slovenia. The former country's close adherence to German monetary policy may be somewhat surprising, as neither Slovakia's central bank nor its financial system have the strong international reputation enjoyed by the central banks and financial markets of its transitioneconomy neighbors. Thus, the close tracking of German policy trends may reflect the reluctance of Slovak monetary authorities to follow a policy that diverges too much from those of Germany, its largest trading partner, and of its neighbor, Austria, which, as we have seen above, also hews closely to the Bundesbank's policies. It may also reflect a lack of confidence on the part of the Slovak central bank in pursuing a more independent policy. Nevertheless, we note that, compared to its transition-economy neighbors, Slovakia's economic performance in terms of growth of output, inflation and export performance have been more than creditable. The other two transition economies, the Czech Republic and Estonia, respond within a period of seven months, a span only marginally longer than that of the Malta, but significantly longer than that of the EU member countries, Austria and Finland. Overall, there is a rough but clearly positive correlation between the intensity of the relationship that a country has with the EU and the speed with which that country's monetary authorities act to eliminate divergences in the long-term relationship between their money base and that of Germany. Nevertheless, those transition economies whose monetary policies are dominated by the Bundesbank tend to react more slowly to divergences between the long-term trends in their monetary polices and those of the Bundesbank than do the market economies in our sample.
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Even if candidate countries do not maintain a fixed long-run relationship between their base money stocks and that of Germany, they may choose to follow the policy lead of the Bundesbank by shadowing the short-term fluctuations in German policy. To do this, they would expand their stock of base money in response to the Bundesbank's decisions to increase the growth of Germany's stock of base money, and they would slow the growth of their base money stock when the Bundesbank does so. Evidence of such short term coordination would be that the coefficients in Equation 1 that reflect the influence of lagged German money growth on the growth of a country's money stock, i x , t-i ,would be positive and significant.
The results of this hypothesis test are reported in Table 3 . The values of i x , t-I for those countries whose money stock is cointegrated with that of Germany are drawn from Table 2; those for the other countries in our sample are drawn from a VAR specification that is identical to Equation 1, with the exception of the error-correction term, which is absent for these countries. Panel C of Table 3 reveals that Finland and Sweden do respond to short-term changes in German monetary policy, although Finland does so in a way that offsets rather than reinforces German short-term policy decisions. That Austria does not appear react to short-term swings in German monetary policy. This finding is not surprising given the speed with which Austria adjusts to any disturbance in the long-term relationship between its monetary policy and that of Germany. Cyprus and Malta, the two cointegrated market-economy candidates, also track shortterm fluctuations in German monetary policy. By way of contrast, none of the transitioneconomy countries who follow German monetary policy in the long run respond to short-run swings in the growth of the German money base (Table 3, 
Conclusions
The motivation for our inquiry was the observation that membership in the EU for both transition and market economy countries will yield mutual benefits only if an exchange rate regime between new members and the Euro-zone countries can be worked out that will be acceptable to both sides. A necessary, if not sufficient, condition for the long-term viability of such a regime is that the new members be able to follow the lead of the ECB in setting their monetary policy. Our results show that such domination of national monetary policy by the Bundesbank, which we see as a proxy for the ECB, quite clearly characterizes the behavior of the most recent members of the EU, Austria, Finland and Sweden. We also find a strong connection between the Bundesbank's policies and those of Cyprus and Malta, two of the market economy candidates for EU membership. Among the transition economies, the ability to follow the policies of the Bundesbank is weaker or, for some countries, not in all cases those that are the most backward in their stabilization and transformation efforts, nonexistent. While we cannot conclude that the failure to follow German monetary policy closely or not at all by the transition economies is an absolute barrier to their joining the EU, such weak policy coordination may reflect the need for a further building up the financial sectors of these countries as well as the 22 need for a period in which these countries do tie their policies more closely to that of the ECB before they join the EU. Notes:
1. The reported test statistics are based on the residuals from the following long run equation:
Log X t = a + b log(German monetary base) t + e t, where X represents the monetary base for an individual country under investigation and e is the error term . Cointegration requires that the error term be stationary. Following Engle and Yoo (1987) 's suggestion, up to 12 lags were initially included in unit-root tests for the error term, and the optimal lag length was chosen based on Akaike's information criterion (AIC). A lag length of three was found to be the optimal lag length in all cases, with the exception of Slovakia for which 6 lags were used.
2. Because the critical values are sensitive to the presence of a constant and/or trend term, cointegration tests were initially conducted using the following three models: model 1 includes a time trend and a constant term; model 2 has a constant term only; model 3 has neither time trend nor constant. The test statistics reported above are based on the best fitting model. In all cases, model 3 was the best fit except for Finland, for which model 1 was chosen.
* and ** denote significance at the 1% and 5% level respectively. 1. The reported significance levels are based on the Newey-West (1987) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. *, **, and*** denote significance levels at 1,5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
2. For some countries, there was a break in the monetary base growth rates, and we used a (0,1) dummy variable to capture the break. These include Sweden (zero until 97:02 and 1 afterwards), Slovenia (zero until 95:03 and 1 afterwards), Cyprus (zero until 95:12 and 1 afterwards), and the Czech Republic (May 1997=1, and zero otherwise). 
